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Araiza v. Roskowinski-
Droneburg: 
DENIAL OF 
REQUEST FOR 
COMPELLED 
DISCLOSURE OF 
EXPERT WITNESS'S 
FINANCIAL 
RECORDS IS NOT 
AN ABUSE OF 
TRIAL COURT'S 
DISCRETION 
WHEN PARTY IS 
GIVEN ONLY THREE 
DAYS NOTICE TO 
COMPLY. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
In Araiza v. 
Roskowinski-Droneburg, 341 
Md. 314, 670 A.2d 466 (1996), 
the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land held that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in deny-
ing Defendants' discovery re-
quest for financial records of an 
expert witness employed by the 
Plaintiff when the witness was 
given only three days to re-
spond to a subpoena requesting 
such documents. The court de-
cided against altering the com-
mon law rule which would have 
required the automatic disclo-
sure of financial statements of 
expert witnesses. The court 
ruled that making such records 
part of "core disclosure" would 
be against Maryland common 
law. Parties seeking discovery 
of such records will continue to 
have to follow the proper rules 
of procedure. 
On January 26, 1989, 
Dr. Schipper ("Schipper") per-
formed a laparoscopy on 
Heather Jean Roskowinski-
Droneburg ("Roskowinski"). 
The appellee, Roskowinski, re-
ceived follow-up treatment 
from January 27 through Janu-
ary 30 from one of the appel-
lants, Dr. Araiza ("Araiza"). 
After these procedures, 
Roskowinski developed peri-
tonitis and loss of bowel func-
tions which resulted in numer-
ous other surgeries including a 
colostomy. Roskowinski filed 
a medical malpractice claim 
against Araiza, Schipper, and 
their medical corporation, Drs. 
Araiza and Schipper, P.A.. 
Dr. Marshall Klavan 
("Klavan") provided expert tes-
timony on the standard of care 
. in the medical procedures at 
issue for Roskowinski. Araiza 
and Schipper requested that 
Klavan produce numerous fi-
nancial records at his deposi-
tion for possible impeachment 
use. Araiza and Schipper, how-
ever, failed to subpoena 
Klavan's records prior to his 
deposition. The requested doc-
uments were, therefore, not pro-
duced by Klavan although he 
did provide testimony concern-
ing several aspects of his finan-
cial status from his work as a 
forensic expert. In October of 
1994, the month the trial was 
scheduled to begin, Araiza and 
Schipper again requested 
Klavan's financial records. To 
effectuate this request, Araiza 
and Schipper 0 btained two sub-
poenas requesting these docu-
ments, one of which was served 
on Klavan at his offices in 
Pennsylvania by order of the 
Court of Common Pleas of 
Delaware County, Pennsylva-
nia, dated October 21. On Oc-
tober24, both parties filed open 
court motions in limine on 
which the court ruled in favor 
of Roskowinski, disallowing 
the requested subpoenaed ma-
terials. 
A jury in the Circuit 
Court for Frederick County 
found in favor of Schipper and 
against Araiza and the medical 
corporation. Araiza filed a time-
ly appeal with the Court ofSpe-
cial Appeals of Maryland, ar-
guing that the trial court should 
have ordered Klavan to disclose 
his financial records. The Court 
of Appeals of Maryland grant-
_______________________ 26.3 / U. Bait. L.F. - 33 
ed certiorari on its own motion 
to determine whether medical 
experts could be required to 
produce financial documents to 
an opposing party for impeach-
ment purposes. 
The court began its anal-
ysis by outlining the trial court's 
rationale for its rulings on the 
parties respective motions in 
limine. Araiza, 341 Md. at 321, 
670 A.2d at 469. The trial court 
ruled that requiring Dr. Klavan 
to produce the requested docu-
ments on three days notice, most 
of which were not ordinarily 
kept, would be '''extensively 
burdensome.'" Jd. Furthermore, 
the trial court recognized that 
the Defendants could use finan-
cial information disclosed in Dr. 
Klavan's deposition for im-
peachment purposes. Jd. The 
court of appeals ruled that this 
decision was an acceptable ex-
ercise of "judicial discretion" 
under Maryland Rule 2-51 O( e). 
Jd. at 322,670 A.2d at 469. 
The court next ad-
dressed whether "professional 
witnesses" submitting to juris-
diction in Maryland should be 
required to supply "written doc-
umentation of their forensic 
activities." Jd. at 322,670 A.2d 
at 470 (quoting appellants' oral 
argument). The court stated 
that this argument assumes that 
attorneys who hire expert wit-
nesses exercise some control 
over those witnesses which 
would allow the attorneys to 
convince their witnesses to 
bring such records. Jd. The 
argument also assumes that "if 
the attorney is unable to con-
vince the expert to do so, the 
34 - U. Bait. L.F./26.3 
attorney would be ethically 
obliged to engage an expert who 
would produce potentially im-
peaching records." !d. 
Araiza rested this con-
trol-based argument on Myers 
v. Alessi, 80 Md. App. 124,560 
A.2d 59, cert denied, 317 Md. 
640, 566 A.2d 101 (1989), 
where the court of special ap-
peals held that a party cannot 
introduce transcript testimony 
of an expert witness in Health 
Claims Arbitration when the 
expert was unavailable at trial 
as a result of the party failing to 
pay the expert's fees. Araiza, 
341 Md. at 322-23, 670 A.2d at 
470. The court of appeals rec-
ognized an attorney's duty re-
garding the use of expert testi-
mony as provided by Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(a)(2)(B), which requires au-
tomatic disclosure of informa-
tion regarding the expert's his-
tory in testifying. Jd. The court 
ruled, however, that an expert's 
financial records are not encom-
passed by this rule. Jd. These 
records, according to the court, 
are not a part of "core discov-
ery" and will not be provided 
without the appropriate discov-
ery request. Jd. The court noted 
that it was unwilling to make a 
rule requiring automatic disclo-
sure of expert witnesses' finan-
cial statements "in light of the 
history of core disclosure in the 
rulemaking process in this State, 
and particularly because any 
'adjudication' in the instant 
matter would be dicta." !d. 
In Araiza v. 
Roskowinski-Droneburg, 341 
Md. 314, 670 A.2d 466 (1996) 
the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land ruled that the trial court's 
denial of requested discovery 
of an expert witness's financial 
statements was not an abuse of 
discretion under Maryland Rule 
2-510(e) when the witness had 
only been given three days no-
tice to comply. The court once 
again failed to reach a determi-
nation on whether expert wit-
nesses can be required to pro-
duce financial statements to the 
opposing party for the purpose 
of impeachment. As attorneys 
continue to use expert witness-
es in medical malpractice 
claims, creating the pseUdo-pro-
fession of "professional ex-
pert," the court of appeals needs 
to more closely define the dis-
covery rules in terms of such 
financial statements to allow 
the factfinder to use them to 
determine this aspect of a 
witness's credibility. 
- Kevin Barth 
